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To invest or not to invest? 
 
It was December 2016, Brandon Snow, Chief Investment Officer at Cambridge Global Asset 
Management1, and his team had just returned from a roadshow at the Ritz Carlton, in Boston. 
They had a Form S-1 Registration Statement in front of them and had an important decision to 
make: “Should we invest in this IPO”?   
In cause was the IPO of Athene Holding, the Apollo-backed life insurer that “came out of 
nowhere” and became one of the largest fixed annuity providers in the United States. Apollo’s 
idea inspired many copycats and other alternative investment firms entered the insurance business 
- the model was gaining broader acceptance2.  
Athene Holding was created in the midst of the 2008 global financial crisis when insurance 
companies where faced with additional capital requirements and an all-time low interest rate 
environment. The company had evolved to a leading annuity provider and was pursuing an IPO 
to become more transparent to the eyes of regulators and rating agencies. Brandon was wondering 
if buying Athene Holding’s stock was the right decision. 
 
The Insurance Industry after the Global Crisis 
 
The Global crisis 
Prior to the financial crisis, the US economy was booming, particularly the housing market 
which had been pushed by an extremely low interest rate environment between 2002 and 2005. 
The period after 2003 was an exceptionally strong one for the capital and mortgage markets 
until 2007 when the subprime mortgage market in the United States started to reveal signs of a 
bubble. Financial institutions were excessively exposed to the mortgage market through 
mortgage-backed securities, bundled loan portfolios, derivatives and credit default swaps thus, 
the crisis in the subprime mortgage market developed into a full-blown global crisis when 
Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008. The securitization, excessive appetite for risk 
and the low interest rates before the crisis where among the main catalysts of the crisis. The fall 
of Lehman Brothers was followed by a global economic downturn as well as a sharp decrease in 
                                                 
1 Cambridge Global Asset Management was a division of CI Investments Inc. a subsidiary of CI Financial 
Corp., which was a Canadian financial services’ company who provided global asset management and 
wealth management services 
2 Ares Private Equity Group, Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, Blackrock and Guggenheim Partners are 
examples of alternative investors that entered in the Annuity industry 
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the capital markets3 globally. (Exhibit 1 shows S&P 500 and Dow Jones’s stock price from 
2007 through 2009 and TED spread’s evolution in 2008) 
 
Implications to insurance companies 
Insurance companies had a great degree of exposure to capital markets4 through its investment 
portfolios however, in most of the cases, these companies sought diversification and focused on 
high-grade investments in order to effectively respond to major turbulences in the capital markets.  
Even though insurers’ assets were mainly investment-grade, the global financial crisis uncovered 
one of the biggest Wall Street scandals related to credit rating agencies. Some blamed the “3 big 
credit rating agencies”5 for being major catalysts of the mass adoption of the new and complex 
securities used to finance subprime mortgages by attributing “Triple-A” ratings to securities that 
were later on downgraded to “Junk”. 
This led some insurance companies and pension funds investing in “Junk-disguised” securities 
that, if not highly rated, would have never existed on such companies’ balance sheets due to their 
strict bylaws regarding risky assets. 
Below is detailed how each type of insurance provider was affected by the financial crisis: 
Mortgage insurance companies 
Mortgage insurance companies’ exposure to the crisis was the highest among all types of 
insurances companies thus, such companies saw their assets depreciate the most among all 
insurers. Given that the crisis major catalyst was the residential mortgage market it is not 
surprising that by 2007/8 mortgage insurance’s assets and capital surpluses achieved in the past 
were being wiped out extremely fast. 
Life insurance companies 
Even though Life insurance companies had less exposure to the housing market, their investment 
portfolio was hit hard due to a global depreciation of the equities. To make it worse, interest rates 
reached low time records and spreads on the equity markets spiked, increasing the cost of hedging 
strategies. 
Large insurance financial groups 
Large and complex insurance financial groups such as AIG were severely affected by the financial 
crisis due their strong affiliations to banks and its operations. Before the crisis, the operations of 
these large financial groups included writing complex credit protection products backing the 
euphoric mortgage lending at the time. When the market crashed, losses linked to these products 
were unbearable and led to the deterioration of their credit ratings and additional collateral 
requirements. 
By August 2009, more than USD260 billion (Exhibit 2) were lost since the financial crisis started 
in 2007. The implications for the insurance sector were devastating and many companies filed for 
bankruptcy or got bailed-out due to its importance to the stabilization of the financial industry (e-
g AIG). The credit rating outlook for US insurance companies changed from stable to negative, 
requiring insurers to hold more capital due to the increased risk. Additionally, as insurance 
                                                 
3 The Dow Jones index lost 18% in one week while the S&P 500 fell more than 20% over the same period 
4 Mainly fixed income (Government and Corporate debt) 
5 Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch Group 
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companies were subject to mark-to-market valuations for some of their invested assets, the sharp 
fall in the valuation of their assets raised tremendous challenges in balance sheet management. 
 
The opportunity for buying cheap liabilities 
During the financial crisis, insurance providers sought to minimize costs and improving their 
financial position in order to increase the likelihood of surviving the defiant times ahead. The 
trends to avoid further losses were the following: 
• Generalist insurance companies or large financial groups providing several different 
types of products decided to focus on their core products and looked for alternatives to 
non-core business lines  
• Life-insurers with legacy liabilities written at high interest rate environments were 
struggling to meet fixed payment thus, were looking to divest blocks due to capital 
requirements 
• Regulators implemented tighter legislation in order to prevent insurers to hold credit or 
liquidity risk on their balance sheets, leading insurers to explore reinsurance 
 
Annuity providers 
Annuity providers were focused on selling spread-driven retirement products such as variable 
annuities, fixed or fixed index annuities. These products were usually long-term oriented and 
promise future stream income to policy holders for the exchange of a premium at inception. 
Moreover, an annuity provider earned the spread between its investment return on the invested 
assets and the rate on its liabilities. (See Exhibit 3 for a detailed explanation of a fixed annuities 
economics6). 
When the crisis erupted, many companies providing retirement savings products had written 
annuity contracts prior to the crisis, promising policyholders fixed payments that would have to 
be met irrespective from the economic environment. By looking at those firms’ liabilities and 
assets’ profiles and, considering the low-interest environment after the crisis (Exhibit 4), it was 
perceptible that some firms would face challenges in earning any spreads on their investments.  
In fact, many life insurers decided to write less annuity products due to lack of confidence in 
earning any spreads on invested assets. Furthermore, for some insurers, the burdens of the 
financial crisis were too high and the resulting capital demands forced some companies to 
downsize or exit the retirement market. 
Nevertheless, the demand for guaranteed savings products had increased due to volatility in the 
financial markets, record low interest rates and an increasing retirement-age population7. This 
caused an imbalance between supply and demand for retirement products as carriers were writing 
less new business while the fundamentals drivers for retirement products were still in place. 
(Exhibit 5 shows the retirement-age population outlook in the US). 
 
                                                 
6 Regarding fixed annuities. Fixed index annuities work in a similar way, but the interest credited to 
policyholders tracks the performance of an equity index, offering to its holders’ equity-like upside 
7 By 2010, US had a population of about 40 million people aged 65 or older and, according to the U.S. 
Census Bureau, the segment was expected to increase to 74 million people by 2030 
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Company Overview 
 
Athene Inception 
Alternative asset managers like the mogul Apollo Global Management LLC8 had been able to 
raise assets from sovereign wealth funds, pension funds and non-profit endowments. As a matter 
of fact, insurance was one of the few trillion-dollar industries yet to be tapped by alternative 
investors.  
By 2008, Imran Siddiqui joined Apollo from Oakhill Capital Partners with the idea of building 
an insurance company and collecting fees from managing its investment portfolio. The idea 
pleased Apollo’s managing partners Leon Black and Marc Rowan who envisioned creating a 
company resembling to Warren Buffet’s insurance company Geico or reinsurance business 
GenRe. This way, Apollo would be able to collect premiums from policyholders to then invest 
them in fixed income instruments, distressed assets, credit funds and buyout funds that the 
company was famous for. In addition, funds collected from annuity holders were also inherently 
cheaper than the funds Apollo had been raising through typical banks and Limited Partners. 
In order to materialize the vison, Apollo Global Management LLC challenged James Belardi, 
previously president of SunAmerica Life Insurance Company, and Chip Gillis, former head of 
Bear Stearns’ Insurance Solutions Group to lead the insurance company later named Athene 
Holding Ltd. Athene’s founders detected the need for a well-capitalized company with an 
experienced executive team (Exhibit 6) to fill the gap left by struggling retirement products’ 
providers. They also realized the demand for retirement savings product was increasing while 
carriers were writing less new products or exploring reinsurance due to unfavorable market 
conditions. In addition, the illiquid nature of annuities’ liabilities was highly appreciated by 
Apollo who had the capabilities to source unique and high-quality investments just by moving 
down the liquidity spectrum. The premises for the company were in place and Athene had a great 
opportunity to enter the life insurance market. 
The company started by acquiring cheap liabilities from struggling peers in order to quickly take 
substantial market share in the retail annuity business. From 2009 through the nine months ended 
in 2016, Athene had grown to $71.6 bn in invested assets, $87.0 bn of total assets and $70.9 
reserve liabilities, establishing itself as one of the largest players in the U.S. fixed annuity 
industry. At the time, the company had grown to 1,360 employees from just 255 employees in 
2012. The risk management team had 30 employees itself. (Exhibit 7 contains Athene’s 2013-
3Q2016 main financials). 
Athene Holding Ltd. was based in Bermuda and its US subsidiaries’ headquarters were located 
in Iowa, United States. Although the company’s activities were mainly held in the US, the 
company ceded 80 per cent of retail annuity liabilities and the totality of its institutional liabilities 
to Bermuda, shifting the risk to its Bermuda based life reinsurer Athene Life Re Ltd. To support 
the intragroup reinsurance agreements, ALRe held most of Athene’s statutory capital9. With that 
configuration, Athene was able to guarantee its operations were not held in the US thus, the 
                                                 
8 Founded in 1990, Apollo Global Management LLC, known as Apollo, was an American leading global 
investment manager. Apollo was founded by former Drexel Burman Lerner employees on the verge of its 
collapse in February 1990. The company’s most notable founders include Leon Black, Joshua Harris and 
Marc Rowan who are currently Apollo’s managing partners. The firm was originally founded to invest in 
distressed companies but by 2005 evolved into three core areas: Private Equity, Credit and Real State. 
9 77% of Athene’s $7.4bn consolidated statutory capital as of December 31, 2015 
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company was subject to Bermuda capital requirements and tax policies for most of its activities. 
(See Exhibit 8 for Athene’s corporate structure). 
Athene had been providing retirement services and, through its subsidiaries, issued, reinsured and 
acquired retirements savings products. Throughout the years company decided to focus on two 
core products – Fixed Annuities and Fixed Index Annuities which had been representing over 
80% of its liabilities. (Exhibit 9 shows Athene’s liabilities as of 30 September 2016). 
 
Athene Asset Management  
Athene Asset Management (AAM), indirect subsidiary of Apollo Global Management, was 
created by Apollo with the purpose of providing portfolio and asset management services to 
Athene. AAM was also led by Jim Belardi, Athene’s CEO, who owned 5% of the asset 
management firm. The goal was to outsource asset management from Apollo and separate 
investment activities from the insurance business. 
As of 30 September 2016, AAM had more than 10010 professionals exclusively dedicated to 
managing and investing 100% of Athene’s portfolio. Moreover, the company invested roughly 
75-80% of Athene’s portfolio with its own investment team and hired several Apollo entities to 
sub-advice specific assets that required unique sourcing and underwriting capabilities for the 
remaining portfolio. Historically, the sub-advisory asset classes have been represented from 20-
25% of Athene’s invested assets and included investments in fixed maturity securities, namely 
yield oriented non-investment grade debt, RMBS, CLOs, ABS, CMBS; and Apollo’s own fund 
investments such as credit and private equity funds. 
Athene Asset Management was contractually bonded11 to Athene and had a fee scheme in which 
it received 40 bps on all assets managed directly. Over the sub-advised assets, Athene paid Apollo 
and its affiliates for providing sub-advisory services and acting as General Partner on the 
investments made by the company. The fees on these arrangements were 40 bps for AUM under 
$10bn and 35 bps for AUM in excess of $10 bn, in addition to the 40 bps gross management fee. 
By the end of 3Q2016, Athene had $71.6 bn AUM of which roughly 80% were managed directly 
by AAM and the remainder 20% fell under the sub-advisory category.  
Since 2013, Athene had been of extreme importance to Apollo and accounted for a big share of 
all assets managed by the Private Equity company. (Exhibit 10 shows Apollo’s 2013-Q32016 
revenues and AUM by business segment and a description of each business segment). 
 “Apollo does not need Athene to be successful, but it certainly helps” said Doug Butler, research 
director at Rockland Trust. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 As of 31 December 2012, AAM had 40 employees 
11 Athene had certain limitations to terminate the contract however, if the board of directors determined the 
amount of fees paid to AAM was unfair/excessive in relation to its performance or when compared to other 
asset managers, the BOD could terminate the contract and AAM had the right to lower its fees and match 
other offers 
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Company Evolution 
 
Inorganic Growth 
Athene’s first steps into the annuity industry was the reinsurance of $1.6 billion fixed annuities 
from American Equity Life Insurance Company in 2009 via its reinsurance entity based in 
Bermuda, Athene Life Re Ltd. (“ALRe”). The following year, Athene licensed Athene Life 
Insurance Company (“ALIC”).  
The company had little activity until 2011 when it revamped its inorganic growth and acquired 
Liberty Life Insurance Company (LLIC), adding $2.8bn of fixed and indexed annuities to its 
balance sheet. With the acquisition, Athene guaranteed insurance licenses in 49 states and 
Washington D.C. Furthermore, still during 2011, Athene reinsured all of LLIC life & health 
business and Transamerica’s fixed annuities and funding agreements, which accounted for 
roughly $2bn and $3.1bn, respectively. 
In December of 2012, Athene completed the acquisition of Presidential Life Corporation and life 
subsidiary at a discount to book value of 52% adding another $4.3 billion assets and announced 
the acquisition of Aviva USA Corporation and its subsidiaries. As of 31 December 2012, less 
than three years after being founded, Athene had roughly $14bn invested assets. 
 
Aviva USA Acquisition 
Aviva PLC was the second largest UK insurer and one of Europe’s main providers of life and 
general insurance products. In 2013, Aviva had over 34 million customers worldwide and held 
operations in the USA through its subsidiary, Aviva USA. 
Aviva USA, headquartered in Les Moines, Iowa, was a leading provider of indexed annuities and 
had more than 900 thousand customers and 1,500 employees. The company was rebranded Aviva 
USA after the acquisition of AmerUs Group Co in 2006 and, as of the second quarter 2013, Aviva 
USA was the 11th largest12 seller of fixed annuities in the US. 
Aviva as many other large insurance groups was still struggling since the financial crisis and 
decided to focus on its core activities in the UK and shred liabilities in non-core segments and 
geographies. Following the departure of previous CEO Andrew Moss, Aviva implemented a 
restructuring plan to shed non-strategic assets as the new European insurance rules13 required 
companies to hold additional capital against assets.  
"The sale of Aviva USA is an important step forward in the delivery of our strategic plan. It 
considerably strengthens Aviva’s financial position, increases group liquidity and improves our 
economic capital surplus whilst also reducing its volatility"14 said Aviva chairman John 
McFarlane. 
                                                 
12 LIMRA database 
13 Solvency II Directive 2009 
14 Aviva to sell Aviva USA for US$1.8 billion. (2012, December 21). Retrieved from 
https://www.aviva.com/newsroom/news-releases/2012/12/aviva-to-sell-aviva-usa-for-us18-billion-17068/ 
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Contrarily, Athene was largely capitalized and looked to Aviva as the perfect opportunity to grow 
its balance sheet with cheap liabilities. Moreover, the large discount on the transaction implied 
that Athene would be able to pay down Aviva’s cost of liabilities in the annuities acquired and 
increase the projected net spread of the products by reinvesting the assets into higher yield 
products. 
The transaction involved Aviva USA Corporation and its subsidiaries, including Aviva Life and 
Annuity Company and Aviva Life and Annuity Company of New York. It was finalized in 
October 2013, for a purchase price of $1.55bn compared to a book value of $2.7bn, implying a 
43% discount. The Aviva USA annuity and life insurance operations acquisition added $35bn in 
fixed annuity products to Athene’s balance sheet which represented Athene’s final step to 
becoming a leader in the fixed annuity space. Following the deal’s close, the annuity provider had 
approximately $60bn in assets, making Athene one of the main fixed annuity companies in the 
US.  
 “Our acquisition of Aviva USA is a transformative event that significantly increases the scale of 
Athene’s fixed annuity business and we are excited about our prospects for further profitable 
growth. Aviva’s operational capabilities and talented workforce will enable Athene to solidify 
our position as a market-leading provider of retirement solutions to policyholders and 
distributors. At the same time, we will offer attractive opportunities for employees and create 
greater value for our shareholders”, said Jim Belardi15, Athene’s CEO. 
 
Organic Growth 
Athene managed to grow substantially in just a few years and positioned itself as one of the main 
players in the US Annuities Sales, particularly in the Fixed-Annuity sphere. Furthermore, as of 
the IPO filing, Athene had roughly $71.6bn invested assets and $70.9bn in reserve liabilities, well 
over the amount at end of 2012 when Athene had only $14bn invested assets. 
Even though Athene’s growth was predominantly achieved through acquisitions, its organic 
channels proved to be capable of acquiring new business and recorded outstanding results. The 
annuity provider amassed $6.9bn of new assets through retail and reinsurance during the first 9 
months of 2016, representing a 169% increase in relation to the equivalent period in 2015. Athene 
demonstrated an impressive growth in FIA sales and by the end of the third quarter of 2016, the 
company ranked 3rd in FIA sales with sales above $3.2bn, representing 6.85% of the industry total 
$46.9bn. Additionally, Athene ranked 7th in overall Fixed Annuities sales16. The company saw its 
ratings improving in 201517 which was considered to be the major catalyst for Athene’s 
impressive sales growth. The management team expected that its retail and reinsurance channels 
would continue to benefit from those improvements in the future. See Exhibit 11a for Athene’s 
Q42015-Q32016 deposits by Product and Exhibit 11a for Athene’s Q42015-Q32016 deposits by 
product. 
                                                 
15 Athene Holding Ltd. Completes Acquisition of Aviva USA. (2013, October 2). Retrieved from 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20131002006528/en/Athene-Holding-Ltd.-Completes-
Acquisition-Aviva-USA 
16 LIMRA Secure Retirement Institute US Individual Annuity Sales Report Q32016 
17 Fitch Ratings, S&P Ratings and A.M. Best improved Athene USA’s subsidiaries ratings to A-  
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Although most of Athene’s assets were acquired, since 2013 the company had new deposits of 
over $15bn, meaning at least 20% of invested assets were written by Athene in a post-crisis 
environment. As for the assets written before the crisis, during high interest rate environments, 
Athene had acquired them at massive discounts, offsetting the higher promised payments to those 
policyholders. 
Since Aviva US acquisition, Athene’s organic sales were responsible for almost all of the 
company’s growth in invested assets. Athene was able to grow quickly and cheap inorganically 
and build a base large enough to place the company as one of the leading carriers in fixed 
annuities. This was particularly important as the competition for acquisitions was then fiercer 
than it was during the crisis when capital was scarce. AAM assumed it would keep tracking 
inorganic opportunities but reinforced the importance of having a solid organic channel. Athene 
demonstrated commitment in prioritizing profitability in detriment of size and said it would never 
set market share targets in order to prevent imprudent growth. 
 
Investment Strategy  
Athene’s strategy had been constant throughout the years and AAM was been able to identify and 
capitalize on opportunistic asset dislocations in the industry. AAM was a return focused asset 
manager with a long-term oriented vision that was suitable for Athene’s need for constant 
earnings. With its portfolio manager, Athene was able to capture excess spread by taking more 
complexity and liquidity risk rather than assuming excessive credit risk. Furthermore, AAM had 
an experienced risk management team who focused on downside protection and stress testing 
under negative scenarios, allowing Athene to avoid binary outcomes on its investments.  
“Athene is the ideal entity to hold highly rated, safe but less liquid credit investments,” said Leon 
Black18. 
As of September 30, 2016, Athene’s invested portfolio available for sale (AFS)19 was composed 
of 93.1% of NAIC20 1 or 2 assets nevertheless, its composition was extremely different from 
typical life insurance companies. Athene benefited with its strategic partnership with Apollo to 
source illiquid assets such as corporate private debt, mortgage loans and more structured, highly 
complex assets. (Exhibit 12a shows Athene investment portfolio as of 30 September 2016 and 
Exhibit 12b shows the typical insurance investment portfolio). 
The company held a substantial amount of difficult to understand products that were overlooked 
by other insurance companies due to their lack of knowledge and experience with complexity. 
From 2009 to 2016, Apollo detected and capitalized on many dislocations in the industry that 
allowed Athene to earn wide spreads on certain assets such as RMBS, CLOs, direct investments 
and Leveraged CMBS. Shortly after the credit crisis, Athene managed to purchase high quality 
cash flowing assets at distressed prices. (See Exhibit 13 for an overview of Athene’s historical 
investment decisions). 
                                                 
18 Private equity: Apollo's charge to the top. (2014, March 10). Retrieved from 
https://www.ft.com/content/dd3c8c42-a825-11e3-8ce1-00144feab7de 
19 AFS amounted up to $53,236 bn as of 30 September 2016. Non-AFS were mainly mortgage loans (hotels, 
retail, office buildings) and alternative investments (funds, strategic investments) 
20 NAIC 1 is equivalent to AAA/AA/A and NAIC 2 is equivalent to BBB 
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For instance, Athene was an early investor in distressed non-agency RMBS in 2009 and 2010, 
prior to the strong recovery of that market in later years. The company acquired a significant 
portion of such assets at discount to par and by 2010, this asset class represented 23.0% of 
Athene’s investment portfolio with 90% NAIC 1 designations21. (Exhibit 14 shows the 2007-15 
evolution of RMBS prices). 
However, as the financial crisis passed by, market dislocations and abnormal spreads started to 
vanish. The Apollo-backed insurer faced with the disappearance of spreads in CUSIP22 securities 
as well as increased competition for acquisitions, understood the need for direct origination in the 
future and invested in companies with direct origination platforms.  In 2013, Athene invested in 
MidCap, a provider of revolving and term debt facilities to middle-market firms in North America 
and Europe, and in A-A Mortgage (AmeriHome), a mortgage lender and servicer. Through these 
two partnerships, Athene developed an important network with many players in the private 
markets that large companies had limited access.  
 
Ability to manage spreads 
Athene’s net investment income had been increasing steadily since 2013, mainly driven by 
successful reinvestments of the acquired firms’ assets into higher yielding strategies sourced by 
AAM. As an example, Athene reinvested a meaningful portion of the portfolio acquired in the 
Aviva USA transaction, in which, the company was able to increase the net investment earned 
rates from 3.5% in 2013 to 4.12% in December 2015. Similarly, during the same period, Athene’s 
net investment income23 had grown from $1.73bn to $2.60bn.  
While Athene’s net investment income increased 68.8% from 2013 to 201624 comparable players 
showed limited growth in their net investment income over the same period. (Exhibit 15 contains 
some of Athene’s peers 2013-3Q2016 main financials). 
Retirement services providers’ earnings were inherently associated with the company’s ability to 
manage the spread between the net investment income and the cost of crediting on deferred 
annuities25. Additionally, life insurers tended to have extremely high asset leverages, meaning 
small spread enhancements resulted in major increases in the return on equity. For instance, 
Athene’s business model required a 7%-10% Capital/Reserve ratio which translated into 10x-14x 
asset leverage. 
For the Retirement Services segment, Athene targeted an annual investment margin of 2-3%, 
which was achieved year after year. Between October 2015 and October 2016, Athene was able 
to increase its net investment earned rate26 (NIER) by 14bps while the company still had over a 
50bps buffer to its guaranteed minimum crediting rate that would be of extreme importance in the 
case of adverse conditions hitting the industry. (Exhibit 16a shows the Retirement Services 
                                                 
21 RMBS represented 15% of Athene’s portfolio with 97.2% NAIC 1 and 2 as of 30 Septemeber,2016  
22 North American registered financial securities  
23 Net investment income is always presented as net of fees paid to AAM/Apollo 
24 Annualized net investment income during the first nine months of 2016 
25 Cost of crediting on deferred annuities is measured in relation to the average account value of deferred 
annuities 
26 Net investment income divided by average invested assets 
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segment 2015 operating income breakdown and Exhibit 16b shows the Retirement Services 
quarterly investment margin from 3Q15 to 3Q16). 
On the Alternatives assets27, Athene achieved an average net investment earned rate (net of fees) 
of 12,13% over the period of 2013 through the nine months ended of 2016. These results were 
mainly fueled by the impressive 28,01% NIER achieved on Alternatives in 2013 after the IPOs 
of two Athene’s underlying investments. Oppositely, the typical life insurance company 
alternative allocation was less diversified than Athene’s and focused on equity investments28 
rather than cash-flow generating assets. Exhibit 17 shows Athene’s Alternative portfolio as of 30 
September 2016. 
Since inception, the life insurer had been able to grow extremely fast without neglecting 
profitability. While most life insurers were targeting returns on equity around 10%, Athene 
targeted mid-teens for sources of organic growth and higher returns for sources of acquisitions. 
One could read in the prospectus:  
“If we are unable to source liabilities with our desired return profile in one of our channels, we 
generally will not sacrifice profitability solely for the sake of increasing market share and instead 
we will typically focus on our other channels to identify growth opportunities that meet our 
preferred risk and return profile.” 
  
Capital Position 
Athene’s core operations, namely any US and Bermuda operations issuing and reinsuring 
retirement savings products and institutional products, were reported out of one reportable 
segment, “Retirements Services”. Additionally, the company reported other operations in 
“Corporate and Other”. Such operations included corporate allocated expenses, M&A costs, debt 
costs, integration and restructuring costs, stock-based compensation and intersegment 
eliminations. The segment also functioned as a support for “Retirement Services” future growth 
and held $1.5bn capital in excess readily deployable. Athene intended to keep the excess capital 
to boost further organic growth or M&A as well as to contribute to rating improvements in the 
future. 
Moreover, Athene had been debt-free since inception and held an undrawn $1bn credit facility 
aimed to provide an additional liquidity cushion during unexpected adverse economic 
environments. As of September 2016, and assuming a debt to capital ratio of 20%, Athene had a 
debt capacity of over 1.5bn that could foment further growth. Altogether, the company could 
deploy $2-3bn29 and still maintain a large enough capital buffer that, combined with the credit 
facility, would allow Athene overcoming challenging economic conditions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 $3.36bn as of 30 September 2016 
28 Mainly Private Equity and Hedge Funds 
29 Life insurers have capital requirements of around 8%, meaning $1bn deployed would acquire an account 
of around $12.5bn 
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Market Opportunity 
As of the IPO, after Athene was established as one of the leaders in the fixed annuity industry, 
market dislocations and M&A opportunities were scarcer however, there were still tremendous 
growth opportunities given the industry’s size and fundamental drivers. 
The number of individuals reaching retirement age was increasing and was expected to experience 
unprecedented growth over the next three decades (See EXHIBIT 3). Additionally, it was 
estimated30 that approximately half of US individuals over 55 years old had no retirement savings. 
The need for tax-efficient savings products was evident and Athene believed many Americans 
were looking to FIAs as perfect solutions to address the need for retirement plans. FIA sales have 
increased the most among all types of annuities since 2012. The annuity industry was 
experiencing a clear shift in products as demand for variable annuities had been declining steadily 
while fixed and fixed index annuities experienced growth in sales. In less than 5 years, variable 
annuities went from representing 67% of the annuity industry in 2012 to only 46% in September 
2016. Contrarily, FIAs sales experienced a CAGR of 16.5% since 2012 and almost doubled its 
market share in annuity sales, accounting for 27% of total sales through the 9 months ended in 
2016. (See Exhibit 18 for the evolution of U.S Annuity sales from 2013 to 201631). 
Since inception, Athene did not pay any dividend and claimed it would continue to retain all the 
available funds and profit in the foreseeable future to fuel further growth and support the 
company’s operations. Even though competition for M&A was increasing, Athene detected that 
some companies were still struggling to meet target ROEs and that the implementation of new 
regulations32 regarding fiduciary obligations could force additional players out of the retirement 
savings market. As a result of such environment, Athene was expecting growth opportunities 
through reinsurance or acquisitions of blocks of business divested by troubled companies. 
By Q3 2016, 29% of Athene’s invested assets were floating rate, meaning a higher interest rate 
environment would increase the company’s bottom line. Additionally, it would allow the 
company to increase crediting rates, turning its products more desirable. 
 
Controversies and Regulators’ Role 
The relationship between the asset manager and the annuity provider had been publicly criticized 
due to Apollo’s allegedly excessive fees received for investing and overseeing Athene’s portfolio.  
“This is characteristic of many private equity firms pushing limits, here into incestuous financial 
relationships, with the general goal of increasing aggregate fees to the firm,”33 said Lawrence 
Cunningham, a corporate governance professor at George Washington University.  
Athene’s Board of Directors, acknowledging worries about governance decided to reduce 
management fees paid to AAM and, included in the prospectus a revised agreement with AAM 
                                                 
30 Report published by the Government Accountability Office in 2015 
31 Values verified at the end of Q3 2016, annualized 
32 U.S. Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) fiduciary rule required retirement advisers to place clients’ best 
interest first by providing impartial plan advice which would expose firms to extra compliance requirements 
33 As Apollo's Cash Cow Plans IPO, Questions Linger on Ties. (n.d.). Retrieved from 
https://www.bloombergquint.com/markets/as-apollo-s-cash-cow-plans-ipo-questions-linger-on-close-ties 
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to incentivise prudent growth – starting in 2017, AAM would take a cut of 10 bps on AUM over 
the value reported at the end of 2016. 
Furthermore, Regulators played an important role on insurance transactions due to its complexity, 
importance to the financial industry equilibrium and how they affected millions of American’s 
retirement savings plans. Transactions involving Athene required even stricter34 scrutiny by the 
regulators and the main reason behind it was the company’s backer – Apollo Global Management. 
Critics, including Athene´s competitors often pointed to the nature of private equity firms and 
their propensity to hold investments with a short-term vision. Moreover, private equity 
companies’ typical strategies were considered incompatible with the life insurance industry as 
they contended a mismatch for long-term products like annuities.35 
“Private-equity firms may not be long-term players in the insurance industry and their short-term 
focus may result in an incentive to increase investment risk and leverage in order to boost short-
term returns,” and “This type of business model isn’t necessarily a natural fit for the insurance 
business, where a failure can put policyholders at significant risk”. Said Benjamin Lawsky, New 
York Department of Financial Services Superintendent.36 
Athene USA President Grant Kvalheim37 denied allegations that Athene had a short-term business 
model due to its private equity ownership, claiming Athene’s capital was long-term in nature: 
“When people talk about ‘private equity’ ownership, the implication is that it is money coming 
from a private equity fund that has a time fuse on it,” he said. “There is not a single dollar 
invested in Athene that has a time fuse on it or comes out of a fund with a time fuse on it. That’s 
always been the case in Athene’s history. The equity that is in Athene is permanent capital. The 
same way the equity in any other insurance company is permanent capital. We are in it for the 
long haul.” 
 
Ownership Structure 
Athene had two classes of voting shares outstanding, Class A common shares and Class B 
common shares. In terms of economic value, both classes were equivalent, meaning the dollar 
value of a class A and class B share was the same however, they were distinct in terms of voting 
power. Moreover, Class A shares accounted for 55% of the voting power while Class B accounted 
for the remaining 45% of the voting rights. Class B shares were exclusively detained by members 
of the Apollo Group, including funds managed by the group thus, Apollo was the ultimate 
beneficiary of the voting control. Additionally, upon sale or transfer of any Class B shares to any 
non-affiliated Apollo entity or person, the shares would immediately be converted on a one-to-
one basis into Class A. So long as at least on Class B share existed, the holder would have 45% 
of voting rights. (Exhibit 19 illustrates Athene’s ownership prior to the offering). 
                                                 
34 Regulators in Iowa and New York required Athene to agree to higher reserves before approving Aviva’s 
acquisition 
35 Athene’s reserve liabilities had a weighted-average life of 8.4 years  
36 Benjamin Lawsky, 2013, at the 22nd Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the U.S. and 
World Economies in New York City  
37 Athene closes on Aviva USA deal | ThinkAdvisor. (2013, October 3). Retrieved from 
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2013/10/03/athene-closes-on-aviva-usa-deal/ 
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As of 28 November 2016, Athene’s largest shareholder was Apollo Alternative Assets (AAA), a 
closed-end vehicle managed by Apollo in which the private equity firm had a 2.4% ownership, 
with 45.6% of total shares. Other main shareholders included Ontario Limited, Stanhope 
Investments, Teacher Retirement System of Texas, Normanton Investments and Athene’s 
executive officers and directors. James R. Belardi itself had a total economic ownership of 2.7% 
in class A shares corresponding to 8.8% of all Class A shares outstanding. Additionally, Apollo 
had an ultimate economic ownership on Athene of 9.1%, comprising both direct ownership and 
indirect ownership. The company had 8% directly via Athene’s shares and 1.1% indirect 
ownership through its investment vehicles (2.4% of AAA).  
 
The IPO 
On 28th November 2016, Athene Holding filed for an amended initial public offering, offering 
23.75 million Class A shares at $38 to $42 a piece plus an additional 3.5 million shares in a clause 
that gave underwriters the option to buy into the company at the offering price. The high end of 
that range would raise $997.5 million to the selling shareholders and value Athene at about $7.8 
billion.  
Among the shareholders selling stock in the IPO were Ontario Limited, Teacher Retirement 
Systems of Texas, Stanhope Investments and funds managed by Apollo, all would retain a stake 
of their holdings after the offering. According to the S-1 filing, Athene would not receive proceeds 
from the sale as the offering’s purpose was to reward committed shareholders who invested in 
Athene since its early days. (See Exhibit 20 for Athene’s detailed ownership before and after the 
offering). 
Besides, the IPO would increase Athene’s reliability as a leading retirement services provider and 
provide the company cheaper access to capital. Additionally, regulators, costumers and rating 
agencies esteemed public companies due to transparent information disclosure and close 
supervision by the financial regulatory authorities thus, going public would be a major step to 
achieve higher ratings and eventually boost deposits in the future. 
 
The Decision 
The range pricing for the initial public offering was set and Brandon Snow, Chief Investment 
Officer at Cambridge Investments was struggling to decide whether or not to invest in the IPO. 
On the one hand, Athene was a compelling growth story that had started from scratch and was 
now an industry leader in the annuity sphere. Furthermore, the industry seemed to remain 
attractive and Brandon was confident enough Athene would continue to acquire more businesses 
and improve its market share in annuity sales due to the strong base of organic channels the 
company had been able to build up so far. On the other hand, Brandon was hesitant to acquiring 
a stake in a company where non-Apollo shareholders had a limited say regarding future strategic 
decisions. Further, Apollo was one of the first alternative investment managers entering the life 
insurance business and Athene had never been tested in a market crash or credit shock thus, 
Brandon was uncertain on how the company would react during defiant conditions. 
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With all this in mind, Cambridge’s investment committee would carefully examine if Athene had 
the foundations that would allow the company to keep growing organically or through 
acquisitions. In fact, Athene claimed it had excess capital to keep acquiring other insurance 
companies or reinsurance obligations however, the competitive environment was different than it 
was in the midst of the global crisis. Furthermore, there was also a lot uncertainty on how Athene 
would be perceived in the capital markets. Would investors believe in a private equity backed 
insurer? Brandon was of the opinion that if Athene continued to achieve superior returns, 
eventually the stock market would value the company’s strategy and its true worth would surface.  
(Information on analyst projections regarding Athene’s next 12 months EPS and Athene’s 
industry peers next 12 months EPS trading multiples is shown in Exhibit 21 and Exhibit 22, 
respectively). 
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Exhibit 1 S&P 500 and Dow Jones’s stock price from 2007 through 2009 and TED spread’s 
evolution in 2008 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Google Finance                                                                          Source: Google Finance 
 
Exhibit 2 Write downs and losses from the beginning of 2007 through August of 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
$261.2 billion 
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Exhibit 3 Illustrative Fixed Annuity Economics 
Source: Company Information 
 
Exhibit 4 Fed interest rates from 2006 to 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Macrotrends database 
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Exhibit 5 Retirement-age population outlook in the US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Exhibit 6 Athene’s Management Team 
 
Source: Company Information 
Athene Holding Ltd. – To invest or not to invest?  
 
 18 
Exhibit 7 Main Financials ($ Million except per share data) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company Information
2013 2014 2015 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2015 2016
Operating Income Statement Balance Sheet Items
Retirement Services margins Total Assets 80 807 82 710 80 854 87 000
Net Investment Earned Rate 5,40% 4,26% 4,37% 4,31% 4,65% Total invested Assets 58 156 59 039 66 959 71 595
Cost of crediting 2,42% 1,94% 1,92% 1,92% 1,97% Total Liabilities 77 952 78 122 75 491 79 926
Investment Margin on Deferred Annuities 2,98% 2,32% 2,45% 2,39% 2,68% Total Equity 2 761 4 555 5 362 7 073
Consolidated Average Invested Assets:
Net Investment Income (Consolidated) 1 730 2 538 2 608 1 928 2 190 Retirement Services average invested assets 25 220 58 284 58 917 58 672 61 948
Taxable Income (Consolidated) 989 532 592 372 367 Corporate and Other average invested assets 745 923 2 567 1 442 7 120
Income Tax expense (benefit) -8 54 14 36 -70 Consolidated average invested assets 25 965 59 207 61 484 60 114 69 068
Non-controlling interest 81 15 16 16 0 Avg. Account value of Defered Annuities 20 308 48 353 48 956 48 881 51 183
After-Tax Operating Income by Segment Equity Segment:
Retirement Services 416 764 769 513 563 Statutory Capital 5 600 7 400
Corporate 361 29 -29 -17 -87 Retirement Services 1 941 2 807 3 974 3 738 4 584
After-Tax consolidated Operating Income 777 793 740 496 476 Corporate and Other 750 1 104 1 625 1 612 1 569
Operating EPS 6,75 6,03 4,22 2,89 2,56 AOCI 70 644 -237 161 920
Book Value Total Equity 2 761 4 555 5 362 5 511 7 073
Book Value Per Share $23,99 $34,61 $30,61 $31,26 $38,02 Avg Equity 2 312 3 658 4 959 4 959 6 218
Return on Equity Avg Equity excl AOCI 2 168 3 301 4 755 4 755 5 876
Operating ROE (excl. AOCI) 35,8% 24,0% 15,6% 13,9% 10,8% Avg Retirement Services Equity 1 793 2 374 3 391 3 391 4 279
ROE exluding AOCI 42,3% 14,0% 11,8% 9,0% 9,9%
ROE 39,6% 12,7% 11,3% 8,6% 9,4%
Retirement Services Operating ROE 23,2% 32,2% 22,7% 20,2% 17,5%
Calculation of Weighted Average Diluted Share Count
Basic Weighted Average Shares Outstanding 113,5 129,5 175,1 171,5 185,9
Dilutive Shares 1,6 2,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Weighted Average Diluted Shares Outstanding 115,1 131,6 175,2 171,5 186,0
Net Income Calculation
Consolidated Operating Income 777 793 740 496 476
Non-Operating Adjustments 139 -330 -178 -176 -39
Net Income 916 463 562 320 437
Net EPS $7,96 $3,52 $3,21 $1,87 $2,35
Leverage, Excess Capital and Capital Ratios
US RBC Ratio 427% 506% 552% 552% 469%
Bermuda BSCR Ratio 237% 323% 323%
Athene Life Re Ltd RBC 468% 468%
Estimated Excess Capital 750 1 104 1 625 1 612 1 569
Excess Capital Per Share $6,52 $8,39 $9,28 $9,40 $8,43
Debt 0 0 0 0 0
Incremental Debt Capacity to 20% Debt/Capital Ratio 673 978 1 400 1 338 1 538
Pro-forma Debt/capital 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Pro-Forma Interest Coverage (6% coupon) 19,2x 13,5x 8,8x 8,2x 6,9x
Nine Months Ended31st December 31st December Nine Months Ended
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Exhibit 8 Athene’s Corporate Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
 
Exhibit 9 Athene’s Liabilities as of September 30, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
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Exhibit 10 Apollo Management Fees and AUM by business segment and business segment 
description 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
 
Exhibit 11a New Deposits from 4Q15 through 3Q16 (quarterly) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
 
 
2013 2014 2015 9M16 2013 2014 2015 9M16
Private Equity 49 908 41 049 37 502 42 181 363 373 288 331
Real Estate 9 289 9 538 11 260 11 059 57 50 55 49
Credit (excluding Athene) 42 730 49 406 54 402 63 801 534 208 244 133
Athene 58 156 59 039 66 959 71 595 260 299 339 322
Apollo's total 160 083 159 032 170 123 188 636 1 214 930 926 834
Assets Under Management (in $ billion) Management and Advisory Fees (in $ thousand)
600 650 
1 150 
2 000 
440 
900 
1 329 
871 
1 290 
1 550 
2 479 
2 871 
 -
  500
 1 000
 1 500
 2 000
 2 500
 3 000
 3 500
4Q15 1Q16 2Q16 3Q16
Retail Sales Flow Reinsurance FABN Total
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Exhibit 11b New Deposits from 2013 through the nine months ended 2016 
 
Source: Company Information 
 
Exhibit 12a Athene’s Investment Portfolio as of 30 September, 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
 
Exhibit 12b Typical life insurance’s investment portfolio.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
 
Deposits by Product (in $ billions)
2013 2014 2015 9M16
Retail Sales 1 300 2 500 2 500 3 800
Flow Reinsurance 167 349 1 100 3 100
FABN 250
Total Deposits 1 467 2 849 3 850 6 900
Corporate 
and Gov’t
50%
Policy Loans & Other
3%
Cash and Equivalents
2%
$71.6bn of 
Invested 
Assets
Alternatives
5%
Mortgage Loans
9%
CMBS
3%
RMBS
15%
~93.1%
Rated NAIC 
1 or 2
ABS/CLO
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Exhibit 13 History of Investments 
Source: Company Information 
 
Exhibit 14 RMBS historical prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
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Exhibit 15 Competitors’ Main Financials ($ Million except per share data) 
 
 
Source: Companies’ Annual Reports
End of the Period 2013 2014 2015 2016 3Q 2013 2014 2015 3Q2016 2013 2014 2015 3Q2016 2013 2014 2015 3Q2016
Total Assets 885 296 902 337 877 933 952 904 731 781 766 665 757 255 819 865 236 945 253 377 251 937 266 605 108 045 111 316 106 431 108 852
Total invested Assets 517 052 505 995 494 459 548 791 398 173 419 986 417 192 465 771 95 291 102 967 102 208 111 591 68 613 71 773 69 128 75 260
Total Liabilities 822 313 829 678 809 437 874 438 695 900 724 306 715 332 762 891 223 493 237 637 238 320 250 282 92 425 94 519 91 794 92 103
Total Equity 62 983 72 659 68 419 78 466 35 881 42 359 41 923 56 974 13 452 15 740 13 617 16 323 15 620 16 797 14 637 16 749
Total Shareholder's Equity 61 553 72 053 67 949 78 286 35 278 41 770 41 890 56 431 13 452 15 740 13 617 16 323 14 393 14 923 12 824 14 871
Investment Income 22 232 21 153 19 281 14 910 14 729 15 256 14 829 11 532 4 754 4 859 4 827 3 630 3 155 3 142 3 138 2 373
Taxable Income 4 052 8 804 7 470 3 370 -1 684 1 759 7 769 5 388 1 631 1 997 1 430 1 262 993 -1 299 -15 -125
Tax expense (benefit) 661 2 465 2 148 480 -1 058 349 2 072 1 300 387 483 276 263 313 -94 -9 222
Net Income to Shareholders 3 368 6 309 5 310 2 888 -667 1 381 5 642 4 084 1 244 1 514 1 154 998 560 -1 244 -615 -380
Average Invested Assets 502 916 511 524 500 227 525 506 401 878 409 080 418 589 444 951 97 178 99 129 102 588 107 570 71 496 70 193 70 451 72 632
Average Equity 63 003 66 803 70 001 74 160 36 891 38 524 41 830 50 524 14 123 14 596 14 679 15 163 15 443 14 658 13 874 13 994
Dilluted Shares Outstanding 1 116 1 142 1 128 1 109 463 468 460 447 275 268 255 240 499 496 497 498
Book Value 55,1 63,1 60,2 70,6 76,2 89,3 91,0 126,4 48,9 58,7 53,4 68,0 28,9 30,1 25,8 29,8
Return on Average Equity 5,35% 9,44% 7,59% 5,19% -1,81% 3,58% 13,49% 8,08% 8,81% 10,37% 7,86% 8,78% 3,63% -8,49% -4,43% -3,62%
End of the Period 2013 2014 2015 3Q2016 2013 2014 2015 3Q2016 2013 2014 2015 3Q2016 2013 2014 2015 3Q2016
Total Assets 39 621 43 990 49 041 55 848 22 403 24 153 24 925 27 035 208 191 219 087 218 660 230 368 541 581 515 581 496 943 514 568
Total invested Assets 30 347 35 982 39 570 45 811 16 223 18 802 19 094 21 025 66 757 68 433 69 821 77 759 356 428 355 766 338 354 346 368
Total Liabilities 38 237 41 850 47 097 53 035 21 264 22 494 23 423 25 101 198 167 208 797 209 228 219 314 440 218 408 309 406 733 425 403
Total Equity 1 385 2 140 1 945 2 813 1 139 1 659 1 502 1 934 10 024 10 290 9 432 11 054 101 363 107 272 90 210 89 165
Total Shareholder's Equity 1 385 2 140 1 945 2 813 1 139 1 659 1 502 1 934 9 684 10 232 9 312 10 795 100 470 106 898 89 658 88 663
Investment Income 1 384 1 532 1 692 1 374 708 760 851 702 3 138 3 258 3 052 2 537 15 810 16 079 14 053 10 479
Taxable Income 389 196 337 -57 508 189 182 16 1 124 1 495 1 431 1 204 9 368 10 501 3 281 3 381
Tax expense (benefit) 136 70 117 -20 160 26 64 6 188 319 178 245 360 2 927 1 059 1 170
Net Income to Shareholders 253 126 220 -38 348 163 118 30 913 1 144 1 234 999 9 085 7 529 2 196 2 192
Average Invested Assets 28 942 33 164 37 776 43 137 16 390 17 513 18 948 20 197 67 784 67 595 69 127 74 357 366 126 356 097 347 060 342 933
Average Equity 1 552 1 762 2 042 2 441 1 215 1 399 1 581 1 749 9 684 9 958 9 772 10 159 99 236 103 684 98 278 89 089
Dilluted Shares Outstanding 75 80 81 84 47 56 58 59 298 299 298 293 1 481 1 448 1 357 1 143
Book Value per share 18,5 26,8 24,0 33,3 24,2 29,6 25,7 33,0 32,5 34,3 31,2 36,9 67,8 73,8 66,1 77,6
Return on Average Equity 16,31% 7,15% 10,76% -2,05% 28,65% 11,65% 7,47% 2,29% 9,43% 11,49% 12,63% 13,10% 9,15% 7,26% 2,23% 3,28%
Metlife Prudential Financial Linlcoln National Genworth Financial
American Equity Life Fidelity Guarantee Life Principal Financial AIG 
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Exhibit 16a Retirement Services Operating Results, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company Information  
 
Exhibit 16b 3Q15-3Q16 Net Investment Margin 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
 
Exhibit 17 Alternatives 
Source: Company Information 
32.0% 17.6%
13.1%
28.2%
9.1%
2013 – 3Q2016
12.13%
(1.85%) (1.95%) (1.96%) (1.99%) (1.96%)
4.52% 4.53% 4.59% 4.62%
4.77%
2.67% 2.58% 2.63% 2.63% 2.81%
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
3Q15 4Q15 1Q16 2Q16 3Q16
Cost of Crediting Net Investment Earned Rate Investment Margin
2015
Net Investment Earnings 2 572
Cost of crediting on deferred annuities -940
Other liability costs -656
Operating expenses -166
Operating income before tax 810
Income tax expense (benefit) 41
Operating Income, net of tax 769
Retirement Services Operating Results (in $ billions)
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Exhibit 18 Evolution of U.S Annuity sales from 2013 to 2016 (Annualized) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: LIMRA database 
 
Exhibit 19 Ownership Structure prior to the offering 
 
Source: Company Information 
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Exhibit 20 Athene’s detailed ownership before and after the offering. 
 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# Shares Ownership Voting Right # Shares Ownership Voting Right
Institutional Investors 52 901 345         28% 55% 72 794 654           39% 55%
Ontario Limited 5 769 231           3,1% 6,0% 4 099 324             2,2% 3,1%
Stanhope Investments 4 615 385           2,4% 4,8% 3 279 460             1,7% 2,5%
Procific 4 936 795           2,6% 5,1% -                        0,0% 0,0%
Teacher Retirement System of Texas 3 653 846           1,9% 3,8% 3 111 276             1,6% 2,4%
Normanton Investments Pte. Ltd. 2 884 615           1,5% 3,0% 2 429 163             1,3% 1,8%
CREL/OAC L.L.C 2 500 000           1,3% 2,6% 2 011 303             1,1% 1,5%
Arizona State Retirement System 1 846 154           1,0% 1,9% 1 311 784             0,7% 1,0%
AAA* -                      0,0% 0,0% 10 507 906           5,6% 7,9%
IPO buyers -                      0,0% 0,0% 23 750 000           12,6% 17,9%
Other institutional investors 13 794 284         7,3% 14,3% 9 357 858             5,0% 7,1%
Directors and Executive officers
James R. Belardi 5 038 922           2,7% 5,2% 5 038 922             2,7% 3,8%
William J. Wheeler 554 311              0,3% 0,6% 554 311                0,3% 0,4%
Grant Kvalheim 2 171 382           1,1% 2,3% 2 171 382             1,1% 1,6%
Martin P. Klein 89 158                0,0% 0,1% 89 158                  0,0% 0,1%
Guy H. ("Chip") Smith, III 276 633              0,1% 0,3% 234 758                0,1% 0,2%
Marc Beilinson 48 304                0,0% 0,1% 48 304                  0,0% 0,0%
Imran Siddiqui 1 961 539           1,0% 2,0% 1 962 540             1,0% 1,5%
Gernot Lohr 1 103 589           0,6% 1,1% 1 179 540             0,6% 0,9%
Matthew R. Michelini 125 000              0,1% 0,1% 125 433                0,1% 0,1%
Robert Borden 40 407                0,0% 0,0% 40 407                  0,0% 0,0%
Hope Taitz 52 618                0,0% 0,1% 52 618                  0,0% 0,0%
Lawrence J. Ruisi 40 713                0,0% 0,0% 40 713                  0,0% 0,0%
Dr. Manfred Puffer 40 511                0,0% 0,0% 40 511                  0,0% 0,0%
Others 1 357 948           0,7% 1,4% 1 357 983             0,7% 1,0%
# Shares Ownership Voting Right # Shares Ownership Voting Right
Holders 135 963 975       72% 45% 116 070 666         61% 45%
AAA 86 130 376         45,6% 28,5% 75 364 079           39,9% 29,2%
Stanhope Life LP 14 480 286         7,7% 4,8% 10 288 961           5,4% 4,0%
Pelmetto 10 069 757         5,3% 3,3% 7 178 246             3,8% 2,8%
AHL 2014 Investor 8 461 538           4,5% 2,8% 6 702 672             3,5% 2,6%
Apollo 14 822 015         7,8% 4,9% 15 080 406           8,0% 5,8%
Marc Rowan 0,0% 0,0% 227 953                0,1% 0,1%
Other 2 000 003           1,1% 0,7% 1 228 349             0,7% 0,5%
0,0% 0,0%
Total 135 963 975       72,0% 45,0% 116 070 666         61,5% 45,0%
Post IPOPre IPO
CLASS A (55% voting rights)
CLASS B (45% voting rights)
Pre IPO Post IPO
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Exhibit 21 Athene’s next 12 months EPS consensus  
Source: Credit Suisse 
 
Exhibit 22 Peers’ next 12 months P/E Ratio 
Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
P/E Ratio 12M FWD Metlife Prudential Financial Lincoln National Genworth Financial American Equity Life Principal Financial Voya Financial AIG
01/01/2015 8,68x 8,69x 8,94x 6,05x 12,23x 11,28x 12,73x 10,85x
01/02/2015 8,19x 8,08x 8,25x 5,70x 11,39x 10,77x 12,06x 10,25x
01/03/2015 8,53x 8,09x 9,14x 7,16x 12,32x 11,55x 12,82x 10,84x
01/04/2015 8,66x 8,29x 9,11x 6,77x 12,04x 11,43x 12,84x 11,06x
01/05/2015 8,49x 8,08x 9,09x 7,58x 12,00x 11,51x 12,47x 11,39x
01/06/2015 8,77x 8,39x 9,27x 7,29x 10,50x 11,40x 12,69x 11,33x
01/07/2015 9,23x 8,66x 9,42x 7,20x 10,39x 11,44x 13,40x 11,81x
01/08/2015 9,41x 8,60x 9,11x 7,12x 10,50x 11,46x 13,39x 12,11x
01/09/2015 8,72x 8,36x 8,60x 4,62x 10,50x 12,33x 12,92x 11,77x
01/10/2015 8,11x 7,70x 7,84x 4,87x 9,30x 10,64x 12,41x 10,97x
01/11/2015 7,80x 7,38x 7,58x 4,94x 9,31x 10,46x 11,38x 10,78x
01/12/2015 8,59x 8,50x 8,67x 4,85x 10,04x 11,37x 12,50x 12,11x
01/01/2016 8,24x 8,29x 7,94x 4,07x 8,98x 10,62x 11,06x 11,83x
01/02/2016 7,22x 7,05x 6,37x 2,45x 7,02x 8,66x 9,04x 10,89x
01/03/2016 6,79x 6,74x 5,56x 2,17x 5,26x 8,71x 8,63x 10,37x
01/04/2016 7,50x 7,29x 6,19x 3,23x 5,75x 9,21x 9,07x 10,39x
01/05/2016 7,59x 7,59x 6,22x 3,26x 5,73x 9,53x 9,06x 10,81x
01/06/2016 7,93x 7,95x 6,96x 4,20x 6,61x 9,86x 9,54x 12,09x
01/07/2016 7,34x 7,21x 6,43x 3,62x 6,58x 9,38x 8,33x 11,15x
01/08/2016 7,11x 7,31x 6,21x 3,17x 6,76x 9,68x 7,13x 10,97x
01/09/2016 7,51x 7,86x 7,03x 4,21x 7,12x 10,39x 8,03x 11,70x
01/10/2016 8,05x 8,02x 7,08x 5,24x 7,43x 10,50x 7,94x 11,21x
01/11/2016 8,52x 8,41x 7,36x 5,66x 7,72x 11,29x 8,36x 11,45x
01/12/2016 9,71x 9,57x 8,96x 5,37x 9,67x 11,98x 9,99x 12,11x
Earnings Estimates 4Q16E 1Q17E 2Q17E 3Q17E NT12ME
Consensus EPS 1,17 1,00 1,07 1,12 4,36
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Summary of the Case 
 
Athene Holding, an annuity provider backed by Apollo Global Management, was envisioned by 
Apollo and two members of the company’s current management team – James Belardi and Chip 
Gillis. The company was founded during the global financial crisis, aiming to capitalize on the 
dislocation happening in the sector. After six years of existence, Athene had become one of the 
leading Fixed Annuity providers in the United States, with more than $71bn in invested assets. 
The company had achieved tremendous growth mainly through acquisitions at large discounts 
from struggling firms, allowing the company to develop a strong organic channel.  
The case is focused on Cambridge Global Asset Management’s investment committee who is 
deciding whether or not to invest in Athene’s initial public offering. Athene had an unorthodox 
corporate structure and was controlled by the private equity mogul Apollo. The case was designed 
to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of private equity ownership/control in life insurance 
companies and its implications to all stakeholders. 
In order to decide if Athene would be a good investment, Cambridge’s investment committee 
should access if Apollo’s ties to Athene would work in favor or against the company’s overall 
profitability. In fact, Athene proved to be a “honey pot” for Apollo but, Cambridge Global Asset 
Management should evaluate the implications for the remaining shareholders. 
 
 
Possible Poll Questions 
 
1. Comment the challenges posed by the financial crisis to insurance companies? What were the 
implications for life insurance companies? How did the bad moment of the market provide a 
good opportunity to Athene’s creation? 
 
2. In Apollo’s perspective, why was life insurance the perfect business to be in? What are the 
characteristics of retirement products that Apollo found most attractive?  
 
3. Why was so important to Apollo that Athene kept growing? Do Athene’s shareholders also 
benefit with scale?  
 
4. What are reputational risks? Why are these so important to companies like Apollo? Do you 
think these risks protect or harm Athene’s shareholders? 
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5. Comment Apollo and Athene’s relationship. What are the Pros and Cons of this relationship? 
 
6. Explain the importance of keeping shareholders and managers interests aligned. How well do 
you think Apollo managed to keep Athene’s management team’s interests aligned with its 
own? 
 
7. What is the role of Regulators? Do they have reasons to be worried about Athene/Apollo? 
 
8. Should Cambridge Global Asset Management invest in the IPO? 
 
 
Suggested Answers 
 
 
1. Comment the challenges posed by the financial crisis on insurance companies. 
What were the implications for Life Insurance Companies? How did the bad 
moment of the market provide a good opportunity to Athene’s creation? 
 
As the crisis of 2008 shattered the banking system, the insurance sector was also largely affected 
due to its tight links to banks and the financial markets. This led to one of the most challenging 
times in the insurance industry’s history. By 2008, the market capitalization of the 10 largest 
insurers shrank by more than 50 percent and, total losses exceeded $35bn38. The sector continued 
to suffer and, according to Exhibit 2, by August 2009, the insurance industry had lost more than 
$260 billion, with AIG being responsible for almost 40% of total losses due to its excessive 
exposure to the subprime mortgage sector. 
The post-crisis era would prove to be extremely challenging to insurance companies. The stock 
market had its worst year since the Great Depression and two of the main indexes, S&P500 and 
Dow Jones, lost half of their value in less than two years. Accordingly, the volatility on the stock 
markets spiked and the VIX reached all-time highs after the fall of Lehman Brothers. To make it 
worse, the Fed interest rate reached an all-time low and short-term treasury bills hit the bottom 
low in 2009, with no expectation to increase in the near future (see Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 4). 
To avoid future crisis with the extent of the 2008 Global Crisis, regulators implemented tighter 
capital requirements to financial institutions. This measure, although inevitable, created further 
pressure on insurance companies because not only their asset side was suffering immense pressure 
with mark-downs and losses in the capital markets, new regulations required additional capital to 
back-up their liabilities. These new restrictions together with the difficulty to raise additional 
equity and the inability to earn returns in the capital markets left many insurance companies with 
no choice but to exit the market or divest some business segments. 
For life insurance companies, the global crisis was less severe than it was for other insurance 
companies, such as mortgage insurance companies or large financial groups, mainly due to their 
limited exposure to the mortgage sector. Even though life insurers were not massive investors in 
residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and structured financial products (e.g. CDOs), 
they were still large investors in securities’ markets, including equities and corporate bond 
markets, where valuations also decreased drastically. Additionally, many life insurers have 
written annuities contracts prior to the crisis with overly-optimistic assumptions, during high 
interest rate environments. As such, faced with a low interest rate environment, life insurers were 
struggling to meet their liabilities as well as earning any spread on their investments. On the 
liability side, the decline in low-risk interest rates and tighter capital requirements implied 
increases in liability levels, leading to even lower returns on equity. Overall, the insurance 
                                                 
38 McKinsey Working Papers on Risk – Responding to the Variable Annuity Crisis (2009) 
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industry was facing a tremendous pressure after the crisis which led many insurance companies 
to exit the market, downsize/divest non-core areas or explore reinsurance.  
On the one hand, the fundamentals for retirement products were still in place – the retirement-age 
population in the United States was increasing and was expected to almost double in 20 years (see 
Exhibit 5); more than 50% of the population did not have any retirement plan and the financial 
crisis caused great anxiety on many pre-retirees who saw their savings depreciate, making them 
look for safer solutions to guarantee a stream of income after retirement. On the other hand, 
insurance companies providing retirement products were exiting the market, looking for 
reinsurance or not writing any new business, creating large imbalances between the supply and 
demand for retirements services products. Additionally, companies divesting or reinsuring blocks 
of annuities were doing it at huge discounts due to their urgency in alleviating their balance sheets 
and comply with new capital requirements. At the same time life insurers were struggling to 
survive the challenging economic conditions, private equity firms were alert to invest 
opportunistically at the market bottom. 
In fact, Apollo “smelled the blood” and saw the perfect opportunity to enter the market and amass 
a significant market share in the annuity industry through cheap acquisitions. Athene was possibly 
a successful idea right from the beginning since Apollo was an opportunistic alternative investor, 
capable to source attractive investments during challenging economic conditions. In addition, the 
private equity company partnered up with an experience management team (See Exhibit 6) who 
knew how to lead a life insurer. Ray Belardi, the chosen leader for Athene had previously built 
and lead SunAmerica alongside Eli Broad, which turned out to be the best performance stock of 
the 90s39. Apollo and Ray Belardi’s vision was to take on SunAmerica’s idea and enhance it to 
form a new company. Actually, Athene was extremely similar to SunAmerica with the key 
difference being the new entity was based in Bermuda in a low tax-environment. 
Athene had the perfect conditions to thrive during the bad moment of the life insurance sector 
because of the opportunity to acquire companies at massive price to book discounts, allowing the 
company to quickly gain market share in the industry while its competitors were writing less new 
business. Even though Athene acquired liabilities that were written at high-interest rate 
environments, the implicit discounts on the acquisitions more than outweighed the higher 
crediting rates, allowing Athene to pay down some of the liabilities and seek better investments. 
Contrarily, Athene’s new contracts were written after the crisis, permitting Athene to hold 
substantially fewer legacy liabilities than its competitors.  
Summing up, the opportunities arising from companies exiting the life insurance market at large 
discounts, the expected increase in demand and decrease in supply for retirement products 
provided the perfect opportunity to Apollo partnering up with an experienced management team 
to fill the void left in the industry.  
 
2. In Apollo’s perspective, why was life insurance the perfect business to be in? 
What are the characteristics of retirement products that Apollo found most 
attractive? 
 
Since inception, Athene concentrated its activities in two core products – Fixed Annuities and 
Fixed Index Annuities which comprised 80% of its liabilities prior to the IPO (see Exhibit 9). 
First, it is important to understand the products and its implications to both policyholders and 
issuers. By looking at Exhibit 3, one understands these products are most comparable to bank 
deposits or certificates with the key difference being annuities usually return higher rates to 
investors given the lack of a FDIC40 guarantee. In practical terms, policyholders accrue interest 
                                                 
39 Broad, E. (2012). The Art of Being Unreasonable: Lessons in Unconventional Thinking. John Wiley & 
Sons. 
40 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is an independent agency of the United States 
government that protects the funds depositors place in banks and savings associations 
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in their annuity account which is tax deferred until withdrawal. Oppositely, providers invest the 
premiums harvested form the policyholders to earn an investment return and, in order to make 
money, they must achieve returns in excess to what it is owed to policyholders and to cover any 
acquisition and operational costs.  
Apollo was known for its Private Equity, Credit and Real Estate funds, which required the 
alternative investor to constantly raise capital from pension funds, wealth funds or endowments, 
as well as debt from financial institutions. Marc Rowan and Imran Sidiqui envisioned Athene to 
be the perfect vehicle to guarantee Apollo’s main obsessions: permanent capital and private credit. 
In fact, traditional funds have finite lives thus, capital invested in Apollo’s buyout and credit funds 
has to be returned to its investors after 7-10 years and, after that period, a new fundraising cycle 
has to occur. Oppositely, insurance does not have a finite life and new policies are constantly 
being written and premiums collected thus, life insurance companies represent great sources of 
permanent capital. 
Additionally, Athene’s liabilities are priced relative to certificate deposits41 which are among the 
cheapest forms of capital while equity committed in Apollo’s funds is relatively expensive. This 
particularity of the life insurance business allowed Apollo not only to have permanent capital but 
also the cheapest type of capital. The annuity industry was indeed the perfect way to achieve 
permanent capital and decrease the dependence on fundraising.  
 The other feature appreciated by Apollo is the maturity of the products. Annuities are long-term 
products42 which do not require providers to pay policyholders before a long period of time, 
allowing Athene to invest in illiquid and complex assets. In fact, Apollo helped Athene achieving 
abnormal returns just by moving down the liquidity spectrum, using its established network in the 
private markets. Additionally, given the long-term nature of the products, Athene did not have to 
hold exclusively liquid assets instead, they had to be highly rated to comply with risk-adjusted 
capital requirements. 
Furthermore, the life insurance industry is known for its high asset leverage in which companies 
can hold invested assets up to 10-14x its equity commitments, allowing companies to achieve 
extremely high returns on equity through small spreads on investments. For instance, 2015 
Retirement Services’ after-tax operating results ($769m) represents a small investment margin of 
131bps however, for a company with an asset leverage of 12.5x, the operating return net of tax 
for that segment is 16.32% which is well above the industry average. The annuity business is 
highly dependent on managing spreads and, Athene has proved it can achieve extraordinary 
investment spreads after fees paid to Apollo. Contrarily, most life insurers had been suffering 
because they were not achieving spreads on their invested assets. 
All in all, Athene is a platform from which Apollo can source capital in a predictive and 
permanent way without the resource to any fundraising initiatives. In addition, annuity liabilities 
are cheap and have a long-term duration which, added to Apollo’s unique sourcing abilities for 
illiquid opportunities and a fair amount of leverage, results in attractive returns for both Apollo 
and Athene’s shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 A few bps more expensive due to the lack of guarantees 
42 Athene’s liabilities had an average life of 8.4 years (Exhibit 9) 
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3. Why was so important to Apollo that Athene kept growing? Do Athene’s 
shareholders also benefit with scale? 
 
In Apollo’s perspective, it was quite obvious that its future earnings depended on how big Athene 
was. Apollo owned Athene Asset Management (AAM) which was responsible for managing and 
investing 100% of Athene’s assets. In fact, Apollo and Athene had a fee arrangement where the 
asset manager (through AAM) received 40 bps of all assets invested plus additional sub-advisory 
fees for roughly 20% of Athene’s portfolio that was allocated to asset classes that required unique 
sourcing and underwriting capabilities (e.g. high yield credit, CMBs, direct investments). With 
this arrangement, Apollo had clear advantages in keeping Athene’s AUM growing as it resulted 
in a larger sum of fees. Even though Apollo’s financial performance was directly linked to 
Athene’s balance sheet size, the alternative investor did not want to promote imprudent growth 
or disregard profitability. Moreover, AAM’s bad performance in managing and investing 
Athene’s assets could lead to the termination of the investment management contract or serious 
reputation damages.  
The remaining shareholders could benefit from scale as well. As in many other acquisitions, 
Athene had been able to achieve cost benefits with its acquisitions by incorporating all the 
operations under the same organization. Although the cost of crediting does not change with 
additional volume, operational expenses such as wages, G&A costs or licensing can be diluted 
thus, growth can indeed generate higher returns for Athene’s shareholders. (See Exhibit 16a to 
understand Athene’s Retirement Services profit breakdown). Another advantage achieved by 
Athene’s acquisition spree was the possibility of being large enough to go through an initial public 
offering that usually rewards shareholders. Generally, public companies are more valuable than 
private companies because the latter are subject to a liquidity discount. In fact, private companies’ 
shareholders are not able to quickly liquidate their positions as they would be if the shares were 
trading.  
Moreover, Athene communicated it would reduce AAM’s management fees for AUM over the 
threshold verified at 31 December 2016. The reduction was estimated to be 10bps therefore, assets 
acquired after 2016 would generate higher investment income than the investments already made 
in the past. Once again, leverage plays a big role in this case and a 10 bps increase in the 
investment margin, leveraged up to 12.5x, accounts for a 1.25% increase in the return on equity 
for new assets. In addition, the fee reduction announcement unveiled Apollo willingness to 
negotiate and anticipates future cuts that would also benefit non-Apollo shareholders. 
Summing up, an increase in Athene’s balance sheet is more attractive to Apollo for obvious 
reasons however, other shareholders may also benefit with growth if AAM keeps achieving 
attractive returns and pursing accretive transactions. Athene has a scalable and efficient platform 
that benefits from growth due to cost synergies and additional distribution channels that future 
transactions bring to the table. 
 
4. What are reputational risks? Why are these so important to companies like 
Apollo? Do you think these risks protect or harm Athene’s shareholders? 
 
Reputational risks are risks taken by companies as of any decision-making process. Companies 
build their reputation to facilitate relations with all the stakeholders they have to deal with. 
Accordingly, reputational risks are threats to the name of a company and can arise from many 
different ways: from the company’s actions, from the employees’ actions, from the nature of the 
company or even through its clients or suppliers. The failure to achieve a good reputation can 
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devastate a company by limiting its ability to retain/acquire customers, negotiate with suppliers 
or raise capital or debt. 
For private equity companies, reputational risks are even more serious. These companies’ 
business is to raise funds and invest them with the promise of achieving high returns for the 
investors. The ability to raise funds is directly linked with the company’s track record and aptitude 
to generate attractive returns. With this in mind, fundraisers have to evaluate every single decision 
they make in any investment because one big failure could jeopardize the company’s ability to 
raise capital or debt in the future. Moreover, private equity companies usually have a core group 
of investors and banks from which they usually rely on when raising new funds thus, 
disappointing one of these investors could result in the loss of important partnerships. 
In Apollo and Athene’s case, the alternative investor is backed by some of the most known 
pension funds in the world such as Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, Teacher Retirement System 
of Texas and Arizona State Retirement System thus, failing to achieve targeted returns for these 
investors could endanger Apollo’s future ability to raise capital from these players. For this 
reason, it seems likely that Apollo would do anything in its power to keep Athene healthy and 
attractive to the remainder shareholders, in a way some of these important institutional investors 
would commit capital in Apollo’s future funds. Furthermore, Apollo itself is a publicly-listed 
company thus, if Athene failed, given its importance to Apollo’s AUM and revenues, the 
company’s stock would probably plunge and, Apollo’s shareholders would take huge losses. 
Nevertheless, Athene’s shareholders benefit with Apollo’s reputational risks since they work as 
a tool to discipline Apollo’s actions as investment managers. As mentioned before, Apollo 
benefits directly with Athene’s growth regardless profitability however, the fear of seeing its 
reputation damaged or being fired as investment managers keeps Apollo disciplined and 
committed to maximizing shareholder value.  
 
5. Comment Apollo and Athene’s relationship? What are the Pros and Cons of the 
relationship? 
 
Athene Holding has been highly controversial since inception due to its highly acquisitive profile 
and tight affiliations to Apollo. Competitors and regulators have been publicly criticizing 
Apollo’s ambitions and plans for the life insurer. In fact, the private equity helped engineering 
Athene and has been earning a large sum of fees from the company in a way that Athene alone 
represented roughly 40% of Apollo’s management and monitoring fees as of 30 September 2016 
(see Exhibit 10). Apollo is not only the largest single shareholder in Athene (9.1%) but also its 
asset manager which allows the company to charge fees for every asset invested. Moreover, 
Apollo is in a position with powerful incentives to lead Athene into making decisions favorable 
to the private equity firm, disregarding the remaining shareholders’ interests. Notwithstanding, 
Apollo is indeed a sharp asset manager and has been extremely successful with managing the life 
insurer’s portfolio.  
Although Apollo owns only 9.1% of Athene’s economic ownership, the way the company is 
structured through its Class A and B shares allows the private equity firm to have 45% of the 
voting rights. This characteristic is a clear disadvantage to other shareholders as their power to 
exert control over Athene’s course of actions is extremely limited. Prior to the IPO, Apollo and 
Jim Belardi who also benefited from AAM’s fee contract, had more than 50% of the voting rights 
together thus, it was clear other shareholders had absolutely no say in Athene’s strategy. Another 
disadvantage is the inherent short-term focus that private equity firms have over its investments. 
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Even though Athene has been reinforcing there is not a single dollar invested in the firm that is 
not permanent, it is impossible to completely disassociate Apollo with having a short-term profit 
focus. This characteristic of private equity firms hurts Athene since regulators, competitors and 
the press have been disbelieving the firm’s strategy, creating a negative image about the 
relationship. Moreover, Athene’s asset allocation strategy is aggressive and has never been tested 
in a credit shock. When looking to both Athene and its comparable firms’ portfolios (see Exhibit 
12a and 12b), it is visible Athene hold a substantial amount of illiquid assets that could eventually 
harm the company during a recession. 
Despite having some disadvantages of being backed by Apollo, Athene also benefits from the 
relationship. Firstly, Apollo was the responsible for Athene’s creation and deserves some credit 
for the idea. Apollo also gathered an experienced management team with a strong track record in 
the annuity sphere who has been demonstrating a strong ability to lead Athene and create value 
for its shareholders. Indeed, Apollo profits and charges more than the common asset manager for 
investing Athene’s portfolio however, Athene’s performance after fees paid to Apollo has not 
been “common” as well. In fact, Athene’s average return on equity since 2013 until the end of the 
third quarter of 2016 was 18.2% while its peers’ average ROE was only 7.0% during the same 
period. Additionally, Athene has been demonstrating impressive growth and its average invested 
assets increased by 166.0% from 2013 through the nine months ended, 2016 while its competitors 
grew only 12.9% on average over the same period. (Exhibit TN 1 shows some key indicators 
comparing Athene’s and its peers’ performances). Apollo’s superior investment capabilities and 
sourcing have been allowing Athene to record impressive returns that would probably not occur 
with a different asset manager. The investment manager has access and expertise to invest in 
certain illiquid opportunities such as Midcap and AmeriHome, private debt or mortgage loans 
(see Exhibit 17), investments that have been overlooked by the average life insurer. These 
investments have been helping Athene getting one step closer to direct origination that, according 
to Athene’s management team, will be where the company will be able to distinguish itself from 
the remaining life insurers due to the disappearance of spreads in trading instruments. 
Additionally, Apollo has “skin in the game”, it holds 9.1% of Athene’s shares which is extremely 
important to align Apollo’s and other shareholders’ interests. Apollo’s stake after the IPO would 
be valued at roughly $710m at the mid-point of the offer range, meaning the investment manager 
will be interested in keeping its holdings appreciating over time. Also, the firm has serious 
reputational risks associated with Athene’s performance because a failure of such dimension 
could compromise Apollo’s future fundraising ability. Lastly, Apollo revised its investment 
management agreement with Athene, paving ways for further negotiations that would increase 
the life insurer’s earnings. 
The most important feature in the relationship that turns it into a win-win situation is Apollo’s 
dependence on Athene. Actually, Apollo’s own performance is highly dependent on fees collected 
from Athene thus, the private equity firm is likely to do anything in its power to keep managing 
the life insurer’s portfolio. Accordingly, Apollo’s most effective way to remain Athene’s 
investment manager is to keep generating value to the company and its shareholders. 
Summing up, the two companies’ relationship is unorthodox and provides Apollo with way too 
many incentives to disregard the remainder shareholders. Despite the clear conflicts of interest, 
Apollo is transparent and an exceptional asset manager and has been rewarding Athene’s 
shareholders year after year with astonishing growth and clear outperformance. At the same time, 
the characteristics of the relationship that allow Apollo to collect a large sum of fees from Athene, 
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are the same assuring Apollo will keep maximizing Athene’s value and rewarding its 
shareholders.  
 
6. Explain the importance of keeping shareholders and managers interests aligned. 
How well do you think Apollo managed to keep Athene’s management team’s 
interests aligned with its own? 
 
The Principal-Agent problem arises when principal’s (e.g. owner) and agent’s (e.g CEO) 
incentives are not aligned. The theory defends a clear distinction between ownership and control 
and implies a friction between owners and managers when the objectives of both diverge. One 
the one hand, managers usually have limited mandates and are mostly concerned with their 
individual performance when leading a company thus, their goals tend to be short-term oriented. 
On the other hand, shareholders’ objectives consist in maximizing the company’s value in the 
long run, meaning they privilege sustainable and less risky strategies. Michael C. Jensen and 
William H. Meckling (1976)43 conducted a research in which they compared the behavior of 
managers who owned 100 percent of a firm in relation to the behavior of managers who did not 
own the full residual claims of a firm. The conclusions suggested agency costs are indeed real 
costs and managers not fully owning a company will generally act to increase their own marginal 
utility instead of maximizing shareholder’s value. In addition, the research concluded that as 
manager’s ownership of a company decreased, the propensity to search out new profitable 
ventures would also decline. The Agency problem has been increasingly gaining relevance in 
corporate governance and, companies around the globe have been applying innumerous strategies 
to mitigate these costs and reduce interest misalignments between agents and principals. Some of 
the most effective ways to alleviate agency costs are the implementation of performance-based 
forms of compensation or stock-based compensation. In fact, managers will stay more committed 
to achieving certain results if their compensation increases accordingly. In addition, stock-based 
compensation incentivizes managers to maximize share value.     
Private equity firms are known for providing the management teams leading their portfolio 
companies’ great incentives to perform in behalf of their own interests. In essence, managers are 
the ones with the deepest understanding and access to information regarding companies’ daily 
operations thus, they are the stakeholders capable of guiding a company into achieving a 
determined target. The most common practice in private equity is to attribute a considerable 
equity portion to the management team upon the buy-out, motivating them to work hard in order 
to achieve a great return at exit. This mechanism assures the management team will have the same 
interest as the private equity firm - maximizing equity value. 
In Athene’s case, the alignment between shareholders and managers was designed in a wicked 
way. Apollo engineered Athene in a way the management team would have its interest aligned 
with their own and not necessarily with the entire firm. Moreover, Ray Belardi, Athene’s CEO is 
also AMM’s CEO and owns 5% of the asset manager thus, he is entitled to 5% of Apollo’s profits. 
In fact, since Ray’s compensation is directly linked to the asset manager’s fees, it would not be 
surprising if he would lead the company in a way Apollo would profit the most. In addition, he 
has a 2.7% stake in Athene in Class A shares, granting him 5.2% of Athene’s voting rights. Hence, 
the CEO and Apollo together have been owning more than 50% of the voting rights, meaning 
                                                 
43 Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 
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they have been detaining full control over the company’s course of actions. Apollo and Ray 
Belardi have incentives to grow Athene’s balance sheet because their own compensation is 
directly linked to AAM’s investment management contract. In a sense, Apollo managed to keep 
Athene’s management team and their own interests extremely well aligned however, the 
remainder shareholders do not probably feel the same. The single mechanism preventing other 
shareholders to be completely disregarded is the Board of Directors ability to fire both the 
investment manager and Ray Belardi who are extremely interested in “keeping their jobs”. In this 
perspective, Athene’s interests are also aligned with Apollo’s and the management team’s ones 
because a poor performance could mean the termination of a relationship that had been extremely 
rewarding for both Apollo and Ray Belardi. 
 
 
7. What is the role of Regulators? Do they have reasons to be worried about Apollo 
backing Athene? 
 
The life insurance industry is of extreme importance to the economy in the Unites States of 
America. Millions of Americans trust life insurers to invest their money in order to lock-in a 
guaranteed stream of income during retirement. Moreover, annuities are long-term orientated 
products and its policyholders rely on the providers to pay out promised benefits in the future. 
Benjamin M. Lawsky, the New York Financial Services Superintendent, has been manifesting 
his concerns regarding Athene’s private equity ownership. According to his statements, private 
equity companies have usually high-risk profiles and a short-term approach to businesses which 
contends a clear mismatch to policyholders’ motivations. Even though Apollo has been claiming 
they are in Athene for the long run and Athene’s capital does not have a time fuse on it, Mr. 
Lawsky’s concerns are obviously worth of special attention and Athene’s transactions have been 
deserving reinforced scrutiny. 
Regulators have one of the most important roles when it comes to approve transactions between 
insurers. In fact, due to the complexity of insurance accounting and reporting, the majority of 
policyholders rely on rating agencies and advisors when deciding from where to buy an annuity 
and, retirees never get to fully understand the specifics of the product. Actually, most annuities 
usually have surrender penalties, limiting policyholders’ ability to terminate a contract and easily 
change the provider. As an example, by the end of the third quarter of 2016, 86% of Athene’s 
annuity products included surrender charges which meant policyholders would be heavily 
penalized if they decided to early withdrawal their annuities. (See Exhibit 9) As such, regulators 
represent the last line of defense to policyholders against changes in the ownership of their 
annuities’ liabilities. 
Actually, policyholders, before approving any transaction, have to access the acquirer’s ability to 
honour the acquired contracts and guarantee policyholders’ promised income. Their role is 
especially more important when acquirers are private equity companies and policyholders have 
no say upon their contracts’ transfer. In fact, regulators must assure there will not be significant 
changes in the risk profile of the assets underlying the retirement services products being 
transferred. However, this has a higher probability to occur when the acquirers have historically 
demonstrated more risk appetite. For instance, in 2013, regulators imposed stricter restrictions in 
Athene Holding Ltd. – To invest or not to invest?  
 
 10 
several transactions in the annuity industry in which the acquirers were private equity companies 
(e.g. Athene acquiring Aviva USA and Guggenheim Partners acquiring Sun Life44). 
In contrast, regulators also sympathized with private equity’s contributions to revitalize an 
industry that was significantly affected by the financial crisis. Actually, Athene was responsible 
for a large number of annuities written after the crisis and established itself as the 3rd largest FIA 
provider in the United States, helping millions of Americans attending their retirement needs. The 
United Sates, as many other developed countries, has an aging population issue and, nearly half 
of individuals approaching retirement age have no retirement savings plan. Faced with this 
problem, regulators have been more welcoming to firms that are in any way contributing to 
alleviate the situation. 
As the years passed by and Apollo’s dependence on Athene increased, the relationship between 
the two proved to be more long-term focused than it was expected at Athene’s inception. 
Nevertheless, regulators should always be vigilant to Athene and Apollo’s relationship in order 
to prevent policyholders from being exposed to excessive risk. If needed, regulators should 
require such type of companies (i.e. private equity backed insurers) to comply with tighter risk-
based capital restrictions or setting up a backstop trust fund. 
 
8. Should Cambridge Global Asset Management invest in the IPO? 
 
The evaluation process Cambridge’s investment committee has to conduct should consider all the 
aspects and consequences of investing in a company with specific characteristics like Athene. In 
this case, Cambridge should focus not only in Athene’s pricing but also in its ability to keep 
growing and consolidating its leadership in the fixed annuity industry. 
Starting with the valuation, Athene set a $38 to $42 share price range for the offering, valuing the 
company at around $7.8 bn at the highest end. One of the most important aspects when investing 
in a company is to access if the share price has potential to increase or not. In fact, in Athene’s 
case, the company has excess capital and a highly acquisitive mindset thus, the likelihood of 
acquiring more companies or liability blocks in the future is certainly high. According to the case, 
as of 30 September 2016, it held more than $1.5bn in excess capital and had a debt capacity of 
$1.5bn, assuming a 20% debt to equity ratio (See Exhibit 7). Supposing the company will want 
to maintain a capital buffer of $500m, Athene could deploy $1bn in equity to grow organically or 
through M&A. Under a conservative scenario, Athene could easily deploy $1bn in equity and 
$1bn through debt issuance which, considering the life insurance industry’s 7-10% capital 
requirement, represents a $23.5bn account value. Considering Athene’s historical retirement 
services operating profit after tax margin of 131 bps (Exhibit TN 2), the $23.5bn addition in 
assets would result in an incremental Net Income of $308.2m which, counterweighed by the 
interest expense of debt at a rate of 5%45 and, assuming a tax rate of around 4%46, would amount 
to total incremental earnings of $247.9m. Moreover, the deployment of $2bn in M&A would 
result in a pro-forma EPS accretion of $1.31 which, added to Athene’s EPS consensus estimate, 
                                                 
44 NY state regulator approves Guggenheim buy of Sun Life. (2013, July 31). Retrieved from 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insurance-regulation/new-york-state-regulator-approves-guggenheim-
purchase-of-sun-life-idUSBRE96U11G20130731 
 
45 Assumed a conservative debt yield of 5% considering the rising interest rates. For example, American 
Equity Life issued debt in 2010 at a coupon of 3.5%. 
46 Average tax rate for the period 2013-2015 was 3.9% 
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(see Exhibit 21) represents a pro-forma EPS of $5.67. In Exhibit 22 are displayed Athene’s 
comparable firms’ historical prices in relation to next twelve months (NTM) EPS and, since 
Athene has been experiencing higher returns on equity and growth than its peers, the company 
should start trading between the group’s median and the 75th percentile NTM EPS (See Exhibit 
TN 3). With this in consideration, Athene’s target price under conservative considerations is 
between $49.2 and $61.2, disregarding any operational improvements that would result from 
future acquisitions. (Exhibit TN 4 summarizes the calculation of the price range under the 
abovementioned M&A scenario). Considering Athene’s potential price alone, Cambridge should 
invest in the offering as Athene’s lowest potential price is 17% higher than the maximum IPO 
share price of $42. 
Furthermore, the retirement services market demonstrates strong fundamentals to support future 
growth: the number of retirees is expected to increase sharply and nearly half of that population 
does not have a retirement savings plan (see Exhibit 5); there is a clear pattern of a product shift 
in annuity sales as the products Athene provides are taking market share from variable annuities 
(see Exhibit 18); and, finally, interest rates are expected to rise which would increase the returns 
in fixed income instruments and, subsequently, Athene’s net investment income. In addition, a 
rising interest rate scenario would also increase M&A opportunities as some potential sellers are 
holding assets to sell them in better macroeconomic environments. (Exhibit TN 5 shows 
predictions for the interest rates). 
Regarding Athene’s strategy, the company recently announced a revised fee agreement with 
Apollo in which assets acquired after 2016 will be subject to lower management fees. This new 
agreement will boost shareholder’s return due to a higher net investment income achieved from 
future acquired assets and sales. The retirement market has yet many sectors to be tapped (e.g. 
corporate pensions) and Apollo will certainly be looking to capitalize on any opportunities that 
prove profitable. This constant search for new ventures is extremely valuable for shareholders 
and represents one of the main advantages of having Apollo backing up Athene.  
Cambridge’s investment committee’s main concern should be Athene’s relationship with its main 
shareholder Apollo. The relationship conveys many advantages and disadvantages for the 
company and its shareholders thus, evaluating the Pros and Cons of the relationship is one of the 
key aspects when deciding whether or not to invest in Athene. In fact, any new investor will have 
limited power to influence the company’s strategy and decisions due to its bylaws regarding 
voting power (See exhibits 19 and 20). Adding to this, Athene is relatively recent and have not 
experienced any downturn thus, it is uncertain how will the company behave through different 
cycles in an industry where commitments can go up to 40 years. 
With Exhibit TN 1, it is possible to conclude Athene had been outperforming its peers in terms 
of ROE, growth and share appreciation - the most important metrics for shareholders. At this 
point, there should be no discussion Apollo is indeed a good investment manager instead, the 
decision must fall on the likelihood of Athene keep achieving good performances in the future. 
Athene has proved to be a “honey pot” for Apollo and the management team thus, it is unlikely 
that they will jeopardize their continuity in the firm by appropriating themselves of the company 
without rewarding the remaining shareholders. Nevertheless, new investors in the company 
should proceed carefully and expect that in the case of a recession, they would probably suffer 
the most while Apollo would still receive a large paycheck as Athene’s investment manager. 
Apollo’s idea inspired many copycats who understood how the annuity industry could provide a 
good source of permanent capital. The new spree of alternative investors entering the retirement 
services market increased competition for acquisitions. Nevertheless, Athene has been enjoying 
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a significant first-mover advantage that allowed the company to develop its organic channels to 
the extent of being one of the largest carriers in the United States. The IPO itself comes in line 
with the increased competition. Rating agencies and regulators have special consideration for 
public companies due to their better access to capital and higher transparency thus, the IPO will 
likely boost Athene’s organic growth.  
Considering all aspects of the deal and Athene’s characteristics, Cambridge Global Asset 
Management should invest in the IPO. Bearing in mind Athene’s past performance, the 
macroeconomic conditions’ outlook and the increasing demand for the retirement services 
products, Athene is well-positioned to keep taking advantage of the retirement market. Moreover, 
the company started from scratch less than 7 years ago and established itself as the 7th largest 
provider in fixed annuity sales and the 3rd largest provider in FIA sales in the United States. 
Meanwhile, Athene has a large capital position readily deployable in M&A that will allow the 
company to keep growing and gaining market share in the annuity industry. Finally, Athene’s 
valuation for the IPO represents a good opportunity to invest in a company with great price 
appreciation potential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Athene Holding Ltd. – To invest or not to invest?  
 
 13 
Exhibit TN1 Main indicators comparing Athene and its peers’ performances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit TN2 After-Tax Retirement Services Profit 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit TN3 Next Twelve Months P/E ratio calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013 2014 2015 2015 2016
After-Tax Operating Income by Segment
Retirement Services 416 764 769 513 563
% of Retirement Services average invested assets 1,65% 1,31% 1,31% 1,17% 1,21%
31st December Nine Months Ended
P/E Ratio 12M FWD Metlife Prudential Financial Lincoln National Genworth Financial American Equity Life Principal Financial Voya Financial AIG
Historical Average 8,20x 8,00x 7,81x 5,03x 8,96x 10,64x 11,26x 10,74x
From 2013 to 3Q2016 Athene Peers
Average ROE 18,2% 7,0%
Cumulative growth invested assets 166,0% 12,9%
Cumulative growth book value per share 58,5% 35,1%
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Exhibit TN4 M&A scenario – Pro-forma EPS accretion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit TN5 FED interest rate outlook 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Numbernomics, September 2016  
